Surely affirmation will follow Boethius' words:
"This world could never have achieved its unity of form from such different and contrary parts unless there were One who could bring together such diverse things. And, once this union was effected, the very diversity of discordant and opposed natures would have ripped it apart and destroyed it, IF there were not One who could sustain what He had made. Nor could the stable order of nature continue, nor its motions be so regular in place, time, causality, space and quality, UNLESS there were One who could govern this variety of change while remaining immutable Himself."
Lady Philosophy provides a picture to illustrate his statement:
“He [God] is, in a manner of speaking, the wheel and rudder by which the vessel of the world is kept stable and undamaged.”
Paul states it like this:
“In Him all things hold together.”
And C.S. Lewis states it another way:
“I allow and insist that the Eternal Word, the Second Person of the Trinity, can never be, nor have been, confined to any place at all: it is rather in Him that all places exist.”
If He governs all things, all things hold together in Him, and in Him all things exist, then why should anyone ever question the direction of the world? Why should anyone ever doubt His supreme power and regulation over all things? Why should anyone ever fear whether or not the will of the Father will prevail? Why should anyone resist the submission to the One in whom all things exist, the One who is the “wheel and rudder," the One who is constant and unchanging, and the One in whom “all things hold together?” Sin has so impaired man’s vision that he has failed to remember the governor of all things; he has forgotten God, though he clearly accepts, consciously or unconsciously, and remembers his own existence on a daily basis.
JDG
Monday, December 5, 2011
Sunday, December 4, 2011
Pain in Heaven?
Well over a year ago I wrote an email to Philip Yancey regarding his book, Where is God When it Hurts? He spoke of pain in the body and how it served a great purpose; Dr. Paul Brand, who was discussed thoroughly in the book, discovered that without pain man could not survive. Pain in the body can be viewed as a bad thing, but it serves a wonderful purpose in a multitude of ways. The book prompted me to write an email to Yancey, and to ask him what he thought about the resurrection of the body. William Rowe’s chapter on Life After Death in his book, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, reminded me of the email. Here is part of what I sent:
“Do you feel that pain, to a certain extent, would still be found in the world today, e.g., in the human body, if man had never sinned? Our view is that pain is 'evil' and 'bad', but with Dr. Brand's studies we see that pain can be a blessing. Do we view pain as 'evil', because we are looking at it from a sinful mindset, i.e., does sin affect our judgment on pain?
What I am getting at is this. If we take a quick glance into the future, will there be 'blessed pain' within a restored creation (including us)? Will our resurrected bodies feel, but not experience pain? Would there be any necessary alarms put in place within the new body?”
To my amazement he replied. Here is part of what he said:
“Indeed I do think there must be some sort of warning system akin to pain, though perhaps without the negative "hurt" aspect, in our resurrected bodies. We have only the slightest clues to go by, of course: Jesus walking through doors yet keeping his scars, the appearance of Moses and Elijah on the Mount of Transfiguration. The New Testament stresses resurrected bodies, however, and I assume this means there must be a protection system built in.”
It is unclear on what our transformed bodies will look like AND how our senses will function within the new creation, but it is enjoyable to ponder.Will we have pain in heaven? What, if any, will be the laws within the new creation, e.g., there is the law of gravity in this life?
JDG
“Do you feel that pain, to a certain extent, would still be found in the world today, e.g., in the human body, if man had never sinned? Our view is that pain is 'evil' and 'bad', but with Dr. Brand's studies we see that pain can be a blessing. Do we view pain as 'evil', because we are looking at it from a sinful mindset, i.e., does sin affect our judgment on pain?
What I am getting at is this. If we take a quick glance into the future, will there be 'blessed pain' within a restored creation (including us)? Will our resurrected bodies feel, but not experience pain? Would there be any necessary alarms put in place within the new body?”
To my amazement he replied. Here is part of what he said:
“Indeed I do think there must be some sort of warning system akin to pain, though perhaps without the negative "hurt" aspect, in our resurrected bodies. We have only the slightest clues to go by, of course: Jesus walking through doors yet keeping his scars, the appearance of Moses and Elijah on the Mount of Transfiguration. The New Testament stresses resurrected bodies, however, and I assume this means there must be a protection system built in.”
It is unclear on what our transformed bodies will look like AND how our senses will function within the new creation, but it is enjoyable to ponder.Will we have pain in heaven? What, if any, will be the laws within the new creation, e.g., there is the law of gravity in this life?
JDG
Alvin Plantinga and The Ontological Argument
“Perhaps no other argument in the history of thought has raised so many basic philosophical questions and stimulated so much hard thought. Even if it fails as a proof of the existence of God, it will remain as one of the high achievements of the human intellect” (William Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 51).
Rowe is referring to Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God; it is a brilliant argument and continues to hold great weight in philosophical/religious debates on God’s existence. Many have opposed the argument, e.g., Kant and Gaunilo, attacking the first premise (Guanilo) and asserting (Kant) “that it [the ontological argument] requires that existence function as a predicate or attribute for a subject – in this case, God” (Groothius, Christian Apologetics, 190). Sound, argumentative reactions to these two men have come forth by further developing Anselm’s argument, but the one most intriguing is that by Alvin Plantinga in his conception of “possible worlds". Plantinga borrows from Leibniz’s cosmological argument, which further borrows from the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) (Groothius 198-199). His argument is this:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists [i.e., a Perfect Being, which none greater can be conceived].
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. That is, God's existence is not impossible (logically contradictory), so we can conceive of a world in which God does exist.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. (Otherwise, it would not be maximally great.)
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
Plantinga’s further development of Anselm’s argument is intriguing and brilliant. It places a “heavy burden of proof on those who deny that God’s existence is possible. One can only demonstrate the impossibility of God’s existence by showing a contradiction within the idea of God” (Groothius 200), which is extremely difficulty if not impossible. Though Gaunilo uses “the greatest possible island” argument to refute Plantinga, his argument fails from the first premise: it is possible that a greatest possible island exists. It is NOT possible for the greatest possible island to exist, nor is it necessary for this island to exist; it is necessary for God to exist by definition. Rowe does well in addressing the ontological argument, showing that the argument still contains a strong force in the dawn of the 21st Century.
JDG
Rowe is referring to Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God; it is a brilliant argument and continues to hold great weight in philosophical/religious debates on God’s existence. Many have opposed the argument, e.g., Kant and Gaunilo, attacking the first premise (Guanilo) and asserting (Kant) “that it [the ontological argument] requires that existence function as a predicate or attribute for a subject – in this case, God” (Groothius, Christian Apologetics, 190). Sound, argumentative reactions to these two men have come forth by further developing Anselm’s argument, but the one most intriguing is that by Alvin Plantinga in his conception of “possible worlds". Plantinga borrows from Leibniz’s cosmological argument, which further borrows from the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) (Groothius 198-199). His argument is this:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists [i.e., a Perfect Being, which none greater can be conceived].
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. That is, God's existence is not impossible (logically contradictory), so we can conceive of a world in which God does exist.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. (Otherwise, it would not be maximally great.)
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
Plantinga’s further development of Anselm’s argument is intriguing and brilliant. It places a “heavy burden of proof on those who deny that God’s existence is possible. One can only demonstrate the impossibility of God’s existence by showing a contradiction within the idea of God” (Groothius 200), which is extremely difficulty if not impossible. Though Gaunilo uses “the greatest possible island” argument to refute Plantinga, his argument fails from the first premise: it is possible that a greatest possible island exists. It is NOT possible for the greatest possible island to exist, nor is it necessary for this island to exist; it is necessary for God to exist by definition. Rowe does well in addressing the ontological argument, showing that the argument still contains a strong force in the dawn of the 21st Century.
JDG
The "Free Will Defense"
The problem of evil has been addressed exhaustively over time by both theists and atheists, as William Rowe makes clear through his chapter on The Problem of Evil in Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction. An intriguing response to the problem is the “Free Will Defense”. Though this post will not explain the defense, because it can be clarified in detail within Rowe’s chapter and elsewhere, it will address a possible change needed for one of the argument’s premises. The argument stated by Rowe is this:
1. God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.
11. God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free are free human creatures and no evil.
12. A world with free human creatures and some evil is a better world than a world with no free human creatures.
13. God creates the best world he can.
Premise 11 would benefit greatly with an addition of one word. A suggested restatement would read as this: “God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free human creatures and no POSSIBILITY of evil.”
As the statement stands now, it appears that in order for humanity to achieve true free will it is necessary for humanity to choose evil (i.e., to choose that which is opposite of God Himself and which is nothing); compatibilism might argue the necessity for evil, so that a “greater-good” might come forth and which a greater-good could not come forth without evil. But it was not necessary for the fall to ever take place; God had already achieved a “good” and ultimate creation. However, if He takes the forbidden tree from the garden, then there is no option to turn from Him. Thus, there would be no free will (e.g., if an apple is never placed before a child, then the child cannot choose to receive or deny the fruit; he is left with only one option: to have no fruit). Therefore, it was only necessary for God to provide an option between two separate “things”. He did not desire for man to disobey Him, nor did He desire evil to come about through such a decision.
It is true that good can be brought about through evil; but it is not necessarily the case for evil to exist in order for good to exist, because God had already achieved the ultimate good in creation without evil. To say that evil is necessary to achieve a higher good is to say that 1) God is dependent upon evil, and 2) evil is the indirect cause of good, which is contradictory. In every world imaginable God foreknew the existence of evil, though its existence was not necessary. Moreover, what is necessary is that God must now do something about evil – the possibility chosen through mankind’s free will – if He desires for His creation to get back to the good that was lost. God, being omnipotent, CAN create a world in which there are free human creatures and no evil. The argument would best be changed, by stating this: “God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free human creatures and no POSSIBILITY of evil.”
JDG
1. God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.
11. God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free are free human creatures and no evil.
12. A world with free human creatures and some evil is a better world than a world with no free human creatures.
13. God creates the best world he can.
Premise 11 would benefit greatly with an addition of one word. A suggested restatement would read as this: “God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free human creatures and no POSSIBILITY of evil.”
As the statement stands now, it appears that in order for humanity to achieve true free will it is necessary for humanity to choose evil (i.e., to choose that which is opposite of God Himself and which is nothing); compatibilism might argue the necessity for evil, so that a “greater-good” might come forth and which a greater-good could not come forth without evil. But it was not necessary for the fall to ever take place; God had already achieved a “good” and ultimate creation. However, if He takes the forbidden tree from the garden, then there is no option to turn from Him. Thus, there would be no free will (e.g., if an apple is never placed before a child, then the child cannot choose to receive or deny the fruit; he is left with only one option: to have no fruit). Therefore, it was only necessary for God to provide an option between two separate “things”. He did not desire for man to disobey Him, nor did He desire evil to come about through such a decision.
It is true that good can be brought about through evil; but it is not necessarily the case for evil to exist in order for good to exist, because God had already achieved the ultimate good in creation without evil. To say that evil is necessary to achieve a higher good is to say that 1) God is dependent upon evil, and 2) evil is the indirect cause of good, which is contradictory. In every world imaginable God foreknew the existence of evil, though its existence was not necessary. Moreover, what is necessary is that God must now do something about evil – the possibility chosen through mankind’s free will – if He desires for His creation to get back to the good that was lost. God, being omnipotent, CAN create a world in which there are free human creatures and no evil. The argument would best be changed, by stating this: “God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free human creatures and no POSSIBILITY of evil.”
JDG
Lack of Faith
Though it is warranted, defending Christianity against Atheists’ claims is troubling. At times it seems that any biblical claim or philosophical argument for the existence of God will only fall on deaf ears. The problem doesn’t seem to be a lack of intelligence/reason/rationality; it is the heart which keeps men from seeing/believing. C.S. Lewis wrote on miracles and asserted that if a man denies even the possibility of a miracle, then no extravagant, brilliant miracle will convince him otherwise, regardless of the amount of evidence. Moreover, while borrowing from this line of thought, it can be concluded that if a man denies even the possibility of a god, then no philosophical or evidential argument will convince him otherwise.
Christians should fervently pray for, converse, and argue with those who attack Christianity. But Christians should also be aware of the problem laying within Atheists’ hearts, while understanding the root of their lack of belief is their lack in a childlike faith. An Atheist can seek the evidence for God; but until he believes, the facts will be misunderstood if seen at all. May God use the philosophical arguments and His Holy Word to draw all men to a humble, childlike faith in His Son, Jesus the Christ.
JDG
Christians should fervently pray for, converse, and argue with those who attack Christianity. But Christians should also be aware of the problem laying within Atheists’ hearts, while understanding the root of their lack of belief is their lack in a childlike faith. An Atheist can seek the evidence for God; but until he believes, the facts will be misunderstood if seen at all. May God use the philosophical arguments and His Holy Word to draw all men to a humble, childlike faith in His Son, Jesus the Christ.
JDG
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