The "Free Will Defense"

The problem of evil has been addressed exhaustively over time by both theists and atheists, as William Rowe makes clear through his chapter on The Problem of Evil in Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction. An intriguing response to the problem is the “Free Will Defense”. Though this post will not explain the defense, because it can be clarified in detail within Rowe’s chapter and elsewhere, it will address a possible change needed for one of the argument’s premises. The argument stated by Rowe is this:

1. God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.

11. God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free are free human creatures and no evil.

12. A world with free human creatures and some evil is a better world than a world with no free human creatures.

13. God creates the best world he can.

Premise 11 would benefit greatly with an addition of one word. A suggested restatement would read as this: “God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free human creatures and no POSSIBILITY of evil.”

As the statement stands now, it appears that in order for humanity to achieve true free will it is necessary for humanity to choose evil (i.e., to choose that which is opposite of God Himself and which is nothing); compatibilism might argue the necessity for evil, so that a “greater-good” might come forth and which a greater-good could not come forth without evil. But it was not necessary for the fall to ever take place; God had already achieved a “good” and ultimate creation. However, if He takes the forbidden tree from the garden, then there is no option to turn from Him. Thus, there would be no free will (e.g., if an apple is never placed before a child, then the child cannot choose to receive or deny the fruit; he is left with only one option: to have no fruit). Therefore, it was only necessary for God to provide an option between two separate “things”. He did not desire for man to disobey Him, nor did He desire evil to come about through such a decision.

It is true that good can be brought about through evil; but it is not necessarily the case for evil to exist in order for good to exist, because God had already achieved the ultimate good in creation without evil. To say that evil is necessary to achieve a higher good is to say that 1) God is dependent upon evil, and 2) evil is the indirect cause of good, which is contradictory. In every world imaginable God foreknew the existence of evil, though its existence was not necessary. Moreover, what is necessary is that God must now do something about evil – the possibility chosen through mankind’s free will – if He desires for His creation to get back to the good that was lost. God, being omnipotent, CAN create a world in which there are free human creatures and no evil. The argument would best be changed, by stating this: “God, although omnipotent, cannot create a world in which there are free human creatures and no POSSIBILITY of evil.”

JDG